















Was there a structural change, after 2009, in the 
relation between macroeconomic and the stock 
market’s performance in the United States? 
 








Dissertation written under the supervision of  





Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the MSc in 
Economics, at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa, 24th of February 2020. 
 
Was there a structural change, after 2009, in the relation between macroeconomic and the stock market’s 
performance in the United States? 
2 
 
Was there a structural change, after 2009, in the relation between 
macroeconomic and the stock market’s performance in the United States? 
by Pedro Melo 
 
Abstract 
During the lasts 10 years, stock markets have witnessed consecutive historical 
maxima, namely the S&P500 index. Parallelly, the associated Cyclically-Adjusted Price-to-
Earnings ratio (CAPE) followed the same path, being substantially above the historic average. 
In the same line, Cochrane (2011) excess returns regression seems to suggest 
overvalued stock prices, similar to the periods that ended at the Dotcom bubble and the Great 
Recession. Moreover, looking 5 years ahead it seems to suggest a stable forecasted path what 
can mean a correction of the actuals’ excess returns over the next years. 
In order to get some clues about this bull-market, this dissertation focuses on the 
relation between macroeconomic and stock market performance proxied by the S&P500 
index from 2009 to 2019. In particular, investigates the relations between the stock market 
and the economic activity, monetary policy and the companies’ financial performance (of the 
companies that integrate the index), through two Structural Vector Auto-Regression (SVAR), 
resorting to the Cholesky decomposition. We find that, comparing with the two previous post-
recessions periods, the current one appears to have a higher positive sensitivity of the stock 
market to a shock on the economic activity and on the financial performance of companies 
(better conditions), as well as a significant negative short-term reaction to a shock on 
monetary policy (tightening). This relation with the monetary policy is strengthened by our 
LOGIT model that approaches the significant relation of the US Federal Reserves’ monetary 
policy surprise announcements on the S&P500 index stock returns.  
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Resumo 
Os últimos 10 anos foram marcados por consecutivos máximos históricos nos 
mercados acionistas, nomeadamente no índice S&P500. Paralelamente, o rácio associado 
“Cyclically-Adjusted Price-to-Earnings” (CAPE) acompanhou a mesma tendência tendo 
registado valores acima da média histórica. 
Da mesma maneira, segundo a regressão dos “excess returns” apresentada por 
Cochrane (2011), é possível evidenciar valores sobrevalorizados, um comportamento similar 
aos períodos que terminaram na bolha Dotcom e na Grande Recessão. Ademais, olhando para 
um horizonte de 5 anos, constata-se uma trajetória estável dos retornos previstos o que poderá 
evidenciar uma correção dos atuais ao longo dos próximos anos. 
 De forma a obter algumas pistas sobre o “bull market”, esta tese foca a relação entre 
a performance macroeconómica e a do mercado acionista, recorrendo ao índice S&P500 como 
proxy, de 2009 a 2019. Por outras palavras, investiga as relações entre o mercado acionista e 
atividade económica, política monetária, e a performance financeira das empresas que 
compõem o índice, através de dois “Structural Vector Auto-Regression” (SVAR), recorrendo 
à decomposição de Cholesky. Comparando os resultados com os dois últimos períodos pós-
recessão, é possível constatar que o período atual evidencia, não só, uma maior sensibilidade 
positiva do mercado acionista a um choque na atividade económica e na performance 
financeira (melhores condições), bem como uma reação significativa negativa, no curto prazo, 
a um choque na política monetária (maior restrição). Relação última fortalecida pelo nosso 
modelo LOGIT que estima a relação expressiva entre os anúncios surpresa da política 
monetária da Reserva Federal Americana e os retornos do índice S&P500. 
 
Palavras-chave: índice acionista S&P500 “bull market”, política monetária não convencional, 
impacto atividade económica. 
 
Nota: O texto foi escrito segundo o novo acordo ortográfico. 
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August 2007, characterized by a turmoil in the financial markets, set the beginning of 
the last economic crisis in the United States of America (US). Following Gorton and Metrick 
(2012) reasoning, “the crisis was started by a bank panic, a run on short-term money market 
instruments, in particular sale and repurchase agreements and asset-backed commercial 
paper”. The banking system faced serious problems related with the loss of confidence, which 
translated into liquidity issues and credit constraints. It did not take too long to infect the US 
real economy, as it was observable a deep decline in consumption and investment, and a 
significant increase of the unemployment. The contagion was spread around the world 
manifested in a slowdown of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) but also, in some cases, to 
activity contractions. 
The S&P500 equity index was not an exception during this period and suffered a 
considerable devaluation, being one of the most significant bear-markets witnessed in history. 
The S&P500 index fell 52% real prices in 2009, only surpassed by the 1929 crash 
representing, at the time, a depreciation of 81%. 
This crisis was the first global and systemic in terms of its magnitude, being the largest 
recession since the Great Depression in the US. The effects were, in some way, smoothed by 
the US Federal Reserve (FED), which have prevented the crisis from equaling or even 
exceeding the Great Depression.  
In this way, some months after the beginning of the Great Recession period, more 
precisely in November 2008, the FED announced the first Quantitative Easing (QE) program 
that lasted until June 2010. It is important to recall that the QE was a set of monetary 
unconventional measures never seen before in the US. This program was composed by three 
interventions, being the second between November 2010 and June 2011 and the last one 
between November 2011 and November 2014. In the end, these programs lifted to an amount 
of total assets held by the FED of around $4.5 trillion. A huge amount when compared to the 
level before the QE, set at $800 billion.1 
                                                          





The application of the QE, also denoted Large-Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP), 
involved two steps: on the one hand, the central bank set the federal funds target range at the 
zero-lower bound; and, on the other hand, it started a policy of securities purchasing from the 
government-sponsored housing agencies, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by those 
agencies and coupon securities issued by the United States Treasury. The expected output was 
to end the panic felt on the monetary markets, stop the impairment, increase money supply 
and decrease the cost of borrowing money in order to encourage borrowing and spending, and 
in this way stimulate the economy. 
It seems quite difficult to say if the results that appeared sometime after were directly 
due to the effectiveness of the QE, but one fact is that the S&P500 index have been 
experiencing one of the strongest bull-markets ever, as can be observed in figure 1. Since 
2009, the S&P500 index has been roaring ahead much beyond the previous maxima, not only 
nominal but also real ones. 
 
Figure 1: Real monthly prices of the S&P500 index. 
 
Nonetheless, it seems important to highlight the fact that the current stock market 
behavior has been happening within a peculiar period. First, because this era has been 
characterized by a slower GDP recovery when compared with other post-recession periods in 
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the US2. In particular, when looking at the period before the Dotcom bubble, we can observe 
an average annual real GDP growth rate of 3.53%, and 2.52% during the period prior to the 
Great Recession. Since July 2009 until March 2019, the real growth rate was just 2.11%. As it 
was argued by Taylor (2014) “this very severe recession was followed by an extremely 
disappointing recovery”. Second, as we have already mentioned this period is being 
characterized by the application of unconventional monetary measures. 
In order to better analyze this stock markets’ behavior, we used Robert Shiller’s Price-
Earnings Ratio approach also known as CAPE (Cyclically Adjusted Price-to-Earnings Ratio) 
or P/E103. 
It is important to note the fact that this ratio is a more consistent indicator to assess 
long financial performance since it allows smoothing the fluctuations on corporate profits 
driven by the business cycles, as the earnings can be volatile from year to year. 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑃𝑡
𝐸𝑡−11→𝑡−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
⁄  (1) 
 
As we can see through the previous equation, this ratio is defined by the current real 
stock price divided by the average of the last ten years of earnings per share (moving 
average), excluding the current period. Both variables are adjusted for inflation (Consumer 
Price Index (CPI)) in order to convert them to real values. It allows us to compare the 
consistency of share prices over time and to have a measure of stock market under or over 
valuation. Moreover, this indicator is also a good predictor of future stock market returns as 






                                                          
2 Again, Gorton and Metrick (2012) support this point of view indicating that “recovery has been weak at best”. 






Figure 2: CAPE ratio of the S&P500 index. 
 
 
As Robert Shiller mentioned4, it is important to look at historic data from which we 
can extract since it is the main teacher concerning lessons of the financial booms and busts. 
Looking at the present situation, as we can see through the figure 2, it is possible to observe 
high current values (or by opposition, low earnings yield), when compared with other periods. 
Additionally, those are only lower than 1929 and 2000. It is important to recall that these two 
periods were considered two major bull-markets, that, as we could see, led to important price 
corrections. Taking into consideration a more recent period (since 1980), we also detect a 
persistent and significant discrepancy between the observed values and the average. 
A rising CAPE ratio could be caused for other factors, real or erroneously perceived 
by investors. In this context it seems important to investigate what is driving this seemingly 
apparent disequilibrium. 
Therefore, it is useful to decompose this ratio in order to understand the reason of this 
significant appreciation since 2009.  
                                                          
4 Financial Times interview – 2015. 
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Figure 3: Real S&P500 index prices versus Real Earnings of the S&P500 index. 
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As it is perceptible by the figure 3, both the real prices and the real earnings per share 
have been increasing since 2009 but the former faster than the latter. This can mean that 
prices are being influenced by some external variable other than the real earnings. 
Simultaneously, it seemed also important to look at the length of the period in 
question. If it was a shorter period, this increase in the real prices, and consequently in the 
CAPE ratio, might be due to some occasional events. However, the effects have been 
persisting for almost ten years. 
Immediately, looking at the significant CAPE ratio mostly driven by an important 
increase of the real stock prices and associated to a considerable duration of ten years, the 
question that came to our mind was the reason behind this abnormal behavior. In other words, 
what are the other structural drivers that are triggering this effect?  
Thus, in this dissertation we try to search for some clues about the stock market 
behavior of the present period looking at some important structural macroeconomic variables 
– the economic activity, the monetary policy impact and the companies’ financial 
performance. 
                                                          





The approach of this dissertation is sustained on a specific research question: was 
there any structural change in the causality between macroeconomic and the stock’s 
market performance since 2009, perhaps caused by the influence of the unconventional 
monetary policy implemented in the US during the period under study? 
In order to address this question, we decided to divide this dissertation in three 
sections. The first looks at the impact of the monetary policy surprise announcements on the 
stock markets. The second tests the relation among the four variables – economic activity, 
monetary policy, companies’ financial performance and real stock returns. Finally, we use a 
well-known stock-market forecasting model based on the notion of excess stock market 
returns in order to look at the S&P500 index overvaluation path. 
 
B. Motivation 
“Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent.” – John Maynard 
Keynes. 
 
The motivation of this dissertation lies in a tentative to better comprehend the behavior 
of the S&P500 equity index in the rather interesting period that followed the Great Financial 
Crisis (2008-2009) by addressing the relation between the stock market’s performance and 
macroeconomic variables, namely economic activity and the monetary policy. The objective 
is to compare the relation across other periods of expansion and try to identify either 
similarities or differences with the current period. 
In order to approach our goal, we decided to start by an introductory model that 
captures the direct impact of the monetary policy in stock markets. With this, we can show the 
significant relation between the two variables, what leads us to give a central role to monetary 
policy in our modelling strategy. 
Having said that, we pursued our approach studying the relation among four important 
variables – economic activity, monetary policy, companies’ financial performance and stock 
markets. This is to say, to study the S&P500 index behavior through these indicators, as it 
was already said. 
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Finally, having some clues about this relation, we decided to simulate the current 
excess returns of the S&P500 index under recent past behavior (1951-2009) in order not only 
to capture the gap between the forecasted values and the actual ones as well as the forecasted 
path for the next five years.  
However, we are aware of the limitations of our approach and more work needs to be 
done in order to conceptualize the impacts that we are going to try to identify, in the next 
sections. 
 
C. A review of the relevant literature 
Due to great improvements within the financial area, it is common knowledge among 
economists that the stock market is a significant variable for the economy and monetary 
policy but is also subject to their influence.  
Therefore, in line with our dissertation focus, we decided to divide the literature 
review in two distinct parts. Firstly, we illustrate the relation between the stock markets and 
the economic activity. Afterwards, we address the relation between the stock markets and 
monetary policy (and its side effects). 
This body of literature will help framing the approach followed in this dissertation, 
including the impact of the unconventional policies conducted since the Great Financial Crisis 
(GFC). 
 
 Relation between stock markets and economic activity: 
Fama (1981), started by arguing about the positive correlation between real stock 
returns and real activity. A few years later, Fama (1990), identified that the future growth 
rates of industrial production, used as proxy for expected cash-flows, were responsible for 
43% of the return variance of annual returns on the value-weighted portfolio of New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) between 1953 and 1987. Moreover, Schwert (1990) sustained and 
complemented this latter point using a longer period (1889-1988). Giving continuity to this 
reasoning, Barro (1990) exposed the significant positive correlation between the stock prices 





Ross (1986) tested positively the impact of innovations, in macroeconomic variables, on stock 
markets. They found significant results for: spread between long and short interest rates, 
expected and unexpected inflation, industrial production, and the spread between high and 
low-grade bonds. Moreover, Fama and French (1989) achieved the conclusion that “expected 
returns are lower when economic conditions are strong and higher when conditions are 
weak”. In addition, Cochrane (1991) approached the idea of forecasting noticing that “stock 
returns forecast real variables including investment and GNP”, also shared by Fischer and 
Merton (1982). 
In the same line, Levine (1996) identified that the stock markets seemed to give a great 
boost to economic development, through the creation of liquidity even after multiple 
regressions controlling for inflation, fiscal policy, political stability, education, the efficiency 
of the legal system, exchange rate policy, and openness to international trade. According to 
this idea, Levine and Zervos (1996) concluded that stock market development is positively 
and robustly correlated with long-run economic growth, in spite of other studies that had 
demonstrated the opposite. Finally, it is important to underline the fact that stock markets 
were important during the period of the 1985-1999, since they represented 33% of the total 
financial wealth in the US, as it was approached by Rigobon and Sack (2003). 
Finally, Lee (1992) approached this inverse relation stating that stock returns “appear 
Granger-causality prior” and, in this way, explain real activity. In the same line, Bernanke and 
Gertler (1999, 2001) argued that stock prices have a direct effect on output. A few years 
earlier (1989), the same authors have mentioned the point of the net worth of the 
entrepreneurs and its importance on the propagation of shocks to the economy.  
 
 Relation between stock markets and monetary policy impact: 
Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009) showed a huge negative interdependency between the 
interest rate setting and real stock prices. In the same vein, Thorbecke (1997), Rigobon and 
Sack (2003 and 2004) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), identified a significant impact of the 
monetary policy (through the interest rate) on the equity markets. In other words, 
expansionary monetary policy leads to positive stock returns. Therefore, Kuttner (2001) 
detailed into a deeper perspective this effect and showed that the responses to a “surprise 
component” of the FED policy is significantly stronger than the response to the change itself, 
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which seems to continue aligned with the actuality. This will be the focus of our first 
empirical analysis in Section 2.  
In parallel, it is also important to have in mind the view that indicates that the stock 
markets represent an important source of information for the conduction of the monetary 
policy, given by the authors Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009). Taking an alternative approach, 
Vickers (1999) concluded that asset prices matter for monetary policy in the way that they 
help to inform judgements about inflation prospects, while advising against including asset 
prices in the measure of the inflation targeted. Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) also argued against 
the inclusion of stock markets variables in the monetary policy making, explaining that asset 
prices tend to be positively correlated with movements in output and inflation, and so policies 
based on these variables will affect indirectly the financial markets. Conversely, Alchian and 
Klein (1973) argued for an inclusion of the asset prices in order to achieve a correct measure 
for inflation since “they reflect the current money prices of claims on future, as well as 
current, consumption”.  
Additionally, concerning the unconventional monetary measures impact and learning 
with past events, Kimura and Small (2004) argued that the “quantitative monetary easing” 
undertaken by the Bank of Japan in 2001, aimed at increasing risk premia on assets with pro-
cyclical returns such as equities. In the same line, Rogers, Scotti and Wright (2014) called our 
attention to the significant reduction of the term premia of the asset-market during the period 
of unconventional measures led by the FED and other Central Banks. Within the same 
rational, Bhattarai and Neely (2016) presented evidence of the US QE impact on the financial 
markets, namely equities having influenced in the desired manner. Moreover, Rosa (2012) 
exposed the facts for a high significance of those measures on asset prices, even after 
controlling for the surprise component of the FED’s communication about the future path. 
Hattori, Schrimpf and Sushko (2016) suggested that these measures seem to have a stabilizing 
and stimulatory effect on financial markets. In addition, Mishkin (2009) showed the 
importance of the monetary policy during the financial crisis in reducing the macroeconomic 








o Monetary policy and its side effects: 
Despite, the at the time Chairman of the FED, Ben Bernanke, was conscious about the 
uncertainty of the monetary policies effects and the certainty about its costs. Concluding, in 
2012, he argued that monetary policy was not as effective as economic policies and could not 
neutralize the “fiscal and financial risk” that a country can face. 
Galí (2014) stated that “monetary policy cannot affect the conditions for existence (or 
non-existence) of a bubble, but it can influence its short-run behavior, including the size of its 
fluctuations”. Similarly, Bordo and Landon-Lane (2013) argued about the positive impact of 
the expansionary monetary policy (interest rate below the target rate) on asset prices and their 
subsequentially correction. In addition to that, Blanchard and Watson (1982) exposed the 
significant real impact of a financial market bubble on the economy. 
 
 
2. A proxy for the monetary policy impact 
 
As it was addressed in the literature review, the monetary policy seems to have a 
significant impact on financial markets, namely in the stock markets, and the other way 
around is also true. 
Moreover, it is known that stock markets react, namely in the short run, to the 
expectations of the monetary policy set by the central bank and do not wait for the 
implementation of the announcements. This is in line with what was argued by D’Amico and 
King (2013) when they state that the effect of unconventional monetary policies is probably 
felt with announcements that are able to change market expectations. Thus, the US stock 
market, namely the S&P500 index, should not be an exception. 
In order to start our analysis, we decided to set an estimation with the objective of 
observing the “immediate” impact of monetary policy announcements on the stock markets. 
In other words, to establish the relation of the investors’ anticipation within the S&P500 index 
to the FED announcements. 
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A. The data 
For this and the following models (except for the last section of this dissertation), we 
shall use data from April 1991 until March 2019, divided into three periods of expansion. 
Those are, for the NBER, limited by the three recessions: 
- July 1990 until March 1991 
- March 2001 until November 2001 
- December 2007 until June 2009 
Therefore, the periods analyzed are: 
- April 1991 until February 2001 
- December 2001 until November 2007 
- July 2009 until March 2019 
 
It seems important to refer the fact that for this first analysis we decided to use daily 
data with the objective of having a more refined view of the FED surprise announcements. 
Moreover, for this model, we shall use the absolute returns variations of the S&P500 
index as dependent variable and absolute variations of the Treasury Bill for 6 Months (T-Bill 
6M) interest rate as explanatory variable, both in nominal values. This “forward-looking” 
instrument is a valuable proxy to track monetary policy since, looking at the data, we assume 
this is one possible way how investors anticipate possible changes in the FED policy or react 
to actual FED surprise policy announcements. This because a shorter term is more lied to the 
establishing of the monetary policy and a higher term looks more at the state of the economy. 
 
B. The model 
In order to address this issue, we decided to use a binary (0;1) model resorting to the 
logistic regression (logit). 
Recall that our objective is to analyze the direct effect of the FED surprise monetary 
policy on the stock returns of the S&P500 index. For that purpose, we decided to use the 
following model: 





Where, 𝑆𝑅𝑡 refers to the nominal stock returns of the S&P500 index, and 𝐷𝑃𝑥𝑡 (x=1,2) to the 
dummy variables described below. 
 





 −  1| > 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉(|
𝑆&𝑃500𝑡
𝑆&𝑃500𝑡−1




1, 𝑖𝑓 |𝑇 − 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 6𝑚𝑡  − 𝑇 − 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 6𝑀𝑡−1| > 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉(|𝑇 − 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 6𝑚𝑡  −  𝑇 − 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 6𝑀𝑡−1|)




1, 𝑖𝑓 |𝑇 − 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 6𝑚𝑡  − 𝑇 − 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 6𝑀𝑡−1| > 2 × 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑉(|𝑇 − 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 6𝑚𝑡  −  𝑇 − 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 6𝑀𝑡−1|)
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Where, STDEV refers to the standard deviation of the period analyzed (previously described). 
 
It is important to note the fact that we are using absolute values in order to keep not 
only the positive changes but also the negative ones of the T-Bill 6M. 
Moreover, in this model, we decided to split these absolute changes, through the 
standard variations, in two parts. In this way, we are assuming that important changes in the 
monetary policy expectations are, at least, twice of the standard deviation of the T-Bill 6M 
during the period in question. 
 
C. The results 
The results obtained through our econometric regression model are in line with what 
was expected. 
However, before we start stating the results obtained, it is important to underline the 
facts that, on the one hand , the 𝑅2 is not very significant for our analysis and, on the other 
hand, the coefficient is difficult to interpret since it depends on the logarithm of the “odds 
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ratio”6. For that reason, only the signal is interpreted and not the magnitude of the coefficient. 
In other words: 
 If the coefficient is positive, it means that a rise in the explanatory variable increases 
the likelihood that the dependent variable is equal to 1.  
 On the contrary, if the coefficient is negative it means that an increase of the 
explanatory variable decreases the likelihood that the dependent variable is equal to 1.  
We can now look at our results, presented in the table below: 
Table 1: Output of the Logit model, between April 1991 and March 2019. 
 1st April 1991 – 
28th February 2001 
1st December 2001 – 
30th November 2007 
1st July 2009 – 
29th March 2019 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
𝑫𝑷𝟏 0.18 0.086 -0.04 0.862 -0.17 0.329 
𝑫𝑷𝟐 0.59 0.000 1.07 0.001 0.41 0.022 
 
These results suggest that the stock market is subject to a significant impact of the 
monetary policy surprises announcements (in our model defined as 𝐷𝑃2). This is to say that, 
using our proxy regarding the intervention of the monetary policy in the investors’ 
expectations, the stock returns are more likely to react. In other words, facing an event that 
makes the rate on the T-Bill 6M to vary by more than twice the standard deviation (for the 
period in question), the stock returns are more likely to change significantly (by more than 
one-standard deviation as per the definition of the dependent variable). Although, it is 
important to mention that this is just a proxy and T-Bills can move for other reasons. 
This result complements the two following models in the sense that it suggests a 






                                                          





3. The macroeconomic relation 
 
As it was observable in this first part and in line with the literature review, monetary 
policy is a significant variable when we are addressing stock returns variance. 
Being our objective to address the stock market behavior since 2009 through 
macroeconomic relations, it seems important to include as variables, not only, the economic 
activity as well as some measure of monetary policy. Moreover, in order to complement and 
sustain the validity of the economic activity results set by the first model of this section, we 
decide to address another relation using the earnings of the companies of the S&P500 index. 
 
A. The data 
As it was already said, for the four following models7, we shall use data from April 
1991 until March 2019, but now in a monthly basis, divided into the same three periods of 
expansion, previously defined. 
In this way, the four variables chosen to approach the two VAR models, presented in 
this chapter, were the following: Industrial Production Index (IPI), the Effective Federal 
Funds Rate8 (substituted by the Wu-Xia Shadow Rate9 during the period of unconventional 
measures), the real earnings per share of the companies that compose the S&P500 index, and 
the real prices of the S&P500 index.10 
 
 The Industrial Production Index11 is used in order to measure the economic activity 
impact (characterized by the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP))12. We shall use the 
                                                          
7 The output of the other models is presented in the Appendix. 
8 A possible measure to capture the impact of the monetary policy effectiveness. Tests with the T-Bill 6M 
variable were also performed and the output obtained was quite similar (results can be assessed in the 
Appendix). 
9 Henceforth explained. 
10 The ISM Index will also be used as a complementary approach of the IPI variable in order to give consistency 
to the first performed VAR (results can be assessed in the Appendix). 
11 FRED definition: This index is an economic indicator that measures real output for all facilities located in the 
United States manufacturing, mining, electric, and gas utilities (excluding those in U.S. territories). 
12 This dissertation is totally aware of the fact that the IPI is a proxy and industry does not represent the economy 
as a whole. 
Was there a structural change, after 2009, in the relation between macroeconomic and the stock market’s 
performance in the United States? 
24 
 
IPI year on year (YoY) growth rate in order to have a monthly measure highly 
correlated with the real GDP Growth YoY (through figure 4 it is possible to observe 
the data frequency between the two variables). Since our objective is to study the 
performance, we decided to use growth rates YoY. 
 
Figure 4: The relation between the growth rates of the Industrial Production Index and the real Gross 
Domestic Product, year on year. 
 
Right axis: Real GDP Growth YoY 
Left axis: IPI Growth YoY 
 
 
The real GDP is one variable frequently used in order to represent the economy. 
However, we are aware of the limitations and problems of this indicator. 
 
 In parallel, the Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) from the Institute for Supply 
Management (ISM), also denoted ISM Index13, will be also used as a proxy to real 
GDP Growth YoY in order to support our analysis with the IPI Index. As we can see 
                                                          
13 Quandl definition - composite index based on the diffusion indexes of five of the indexes with equal weights: 
New Orders (seasonally adjusted), Production (seasonally adjusted), Employment (seasonally adjusted), Supplier 
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through the figure below, this indicator is also highly correlated with the real GDP 
growth rate. 
 
Figure 5: The relation between the ISM Index and the real Gross Domestic Product growth rate year on 
year. 
 
Right axis: Real GDP Growth YoY 
Left axis: ISM Index 
 
 
 The variable Effective Federal Funds Rate14 is used in order to account for the 
monetary policy impact. The reason why it was chosen is the high correlation with the 
Federal Funds Target Range, as we can see through the figure 615. 
Thus, during the period of unconventional monetary measures the impact is measured 




                                                          
14 The effective federal funds rate is the interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds 
(balances held at Federal Reserve Banks) with each other overnight. 
15 This proxy was firstly approached by Bernanke, B and Blinder, A (1992). 
16 This shadow rate will not suffer more updates as long as target range for the federal funds rate is at or above 
25 to 50 basis points. The reason behind is the high correlation between the Wu-Xia rate and effective federal 
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Figure 6: The relation between the Effective Federal Funds Rate and the Federal Funds Targets. 
17 
 
Figure 7: Wu-Xia Shadow Federal Funds Rate. 
18 
 
As we can see through the figure 7, during the Quantitative Easing, the rate is negative 
due to the set of unconventional measures. 
 
 The earnings are represented by the real earnings per share of the companies that 
belong to the S&P500 index and are used in order to track the 
profitability/performance of the same. In order to have stationarity and to track 
performance, we decided to apply the growth rate year on year of this variable. 
                                                          
17 Federal Reserve of St. Louis (FRED) - https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU#0 





 The stock markets are represented by the S&P500 index through the real stock returns 
growth rate year on year of the same index. Again, since our objective is to track the 
performance of the variables, having stationarity, we decided to use growth rate year 
on year. 
 
These two last variables are deflated through the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in order to 
approach the real values. 
 
B. A first approach 
 
i. The model 
In order to study the real economic and monetary impacts on the stock markets (more 
precisely the S&P500 index) we decided to estimate a Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) model. 
The main reasons were the endogeneity between the three variables and, giving this reality, to 
have the possibility of subjecting these to structural shocks and, more important, to be able to 
analyze them. This is in line with what Lee (1992) argued about the usefulness of a VAR 
approach for investigating the relationship between stock returns and other variables. 
The generic model can be presented with the following notation: 
{
𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑡 =  𝐶1 + 𝑎11
1 𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝑎12
1 𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝑎13







𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡 = 𝐶2 + 𝑎21
1 𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝑎22
1 𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝑎23




𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡−𝑝 +  𝑎23
𝑝
𝑆𝑅𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜀2𝑡
𝑆𝑅𝑡 = 𝐶3 + 𝑎31
1 𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝑎32
1 𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝑎33




𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡−𝑝 +  𝑎33
𝑝
𝑆𝑅𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜀3𝑡
  , 
Where 𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑡 refers to IPI growth rate YoY (IPI YoY), and 𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡 to effective federal (Fed) funds rate, 
and 𝑆𝑅𝑡 to real stock returns YoY. 
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Therefore, the reduced form can be written as: 
𝐴(𝐿)𝑌𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡 
Where, 𝐴(𝐿) = 1 −  𝐴1𝐿 − 𝐴2𝐿2  − 𝐴3𝐿3− . . . −𝐴𝑝𝐿𝑝 
Being L the lag operator and 𝑌𝑡 the matrix formed by the three variables that belong to our model. 
 




In order to be able to submit the three variables of the model to structural shocks from 
each of them, we decided to transform the VAR in a Structural Vector Auto-Regression 
(SVAR), resorting to the Cholesky decomposition. 
Therefore, following the Cholesky approach, the reduced model can be written as: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴
−1(𝐿)𝐶𝜇𝑡 






Moreover, 𝜇𝑡 is the error matrix composed by the structural shocks. The construction of the 
latter needs to be carefully developed since the order of the variables is highly significant for 
the results. 






Here we are assuming that the Industrial Production Index reacts immediately only to 
its own shock. An example of this shock can be a productivity shock in the economy. 
                                                          





In the same line, the Effective Federal Funds Rate reacts immediately both to a shock 
to the IPI and to its own shock. An example of the latter can be a surprise interest rate 
increase by the FED. 
Finally, the Stock Returns react immediately not only to its own shock as well as to 
the IPI and effective federal funds rate shocks. An example of an own shock within the 
S&P500 index can be a re-appraisal of the multiples (also called Price-Earnings ratio). With 
this movement, investors will expect more (or less) for 1 unit of the earnings tomorrow, 
depending on whether we are in presence of a positive (or negative) shock. 















ii. Robustness of the model 
The robustness of this model was studied through the performance of one complement 
VAR that includes the ISM Index instead of the IPI YoY, as primarily mentioned. The results 
obtained through this variable are similar to the ones that we shall present and are available in 
the appendix. Moreover, another test was performed with the T-Bill 6M instead of the 
Effective Federal Funds Rate variable and the results were also quite similar. The similarity 
reinforces the consistency of the results achieved in our previous model. 
Yet, it could be the case that some variables are not stationary although we should be 
aware that this is not a problem since without cointegration among the variables used, the 
VAR model continues to be well specified. Nevertheless, the VAR satisfies the stability 
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iii. The results 
The lag length of the model is supported by the five criteria presented on the EViews 
program – Sequential modified likelihood ratio, Final prediction error, Akaike information 
criterion, Schwarz information criterion, Hannan-Quinn information criterion. 
The importance of the lag length is well stressed by Braun and Mittnik (1993), which 
showed the fact that when lag length in a VAR model is different from the true lag length, the 
estimates are inconsistent as well as the respective impulse-response functions and variance 
decomposition. Similarly, Lütkepohl (1993) indicates that an overfitting, in other words, a 
higher order lag length than the true lag length causes an increase in the mean-square forecast 
errors. In the same line, an underfitting of the lag length often generates autocorrelated errors. 
The results are presented in the form of impulse-response functions to shocks in each 
of the VAR variables. It is important to clarify that the measures are in percentage points. 
This means that a x percentage point increase in a variable lead to an y percentage point 
variation in the other variable.  
It should be recalled that the objective of this model is to uncover the relation between 
the three variables in the most recent period (July 2009 – March 2019) comparing with the 
other previous periods of expansion, in order to track the current bull market of the S&P500 














a) April 1991 until March 2019 
 
 
Output Figures 1: Impulse-Response Functions of the three variables (IPI growth rate YoY, effective 
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The results seem to be aligned with what is usually argued in the economic literature 
as showed in our literature review, though with some exceptions. 
Starting by these exceptions, namely the monetary policy impact, it is observable that 
the responses of the IPI YoY and the real stock returns YoY to a positive shock in the variable 
effective federal funds rate are not intuitive. Thus, the results should be read with caution 
since zero is inside the confidence bands. So, upon a 1 percentage point increase of the 
interest rate (tightening of the monetary policy), the economic activity seems to increase 0.2 
percentage points in the short run (after 1,5 years). Regarding the stock market, it is possible 
to observe that a tightening of the monetary policy seems to have a negative impact in the 
short-term but quickly compensated in the medium-term. A result that might warrant more 
work in order to interpret this unintuitive outcome.  
Besides, we can observe a positive correlation between the economic activity and the 
real stock returns, knowing that the impact of the latter on the economic activity is smaller 
and slower than the opposite. This result is in line with the conclusion set in our literature 
review. 
In other words, the positive response of the IPI YoY to a 1 percentage point increase 
of the real stock returns is set at 0.8 percentage points in 1 year. The opposite follows the 
same tendency but with different magnitudes. For a 1 percentage point increase of the IPI 
YoY, the real stock returns tend to increase around 1.5 percentage points during the firsts 6 
months. 
Another interesting finding is the reaction of the monetary policy when the economic 
activity and stock market are improving. This means, upon a 1 percentage point increase of 
the IPI YoY, the effective federal funds rate tends to increase around 0.1 percentage points. 
The same relation is also true to a positive shock in real stock returns YoY. This can give us 
some ideas about the behavior of the FED, which tends to increase the interest rate when 









b) April 1991 until February 2001 
 
Output Figures 2: Impulse-Response Functions of the three variables (IPI growth rate YoY, effective 
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In order to analyze the monetary policy impact in the stock markets it is important to 
contextualize the period. At the time, the Chairman of the FED, Allan Greenspan, led a policy 
of significant interest rate reduction between 1988 and 1992. After that, it was possible to 
observe a strong bull market of the stock markets and a significant recovery of the economy 
accompanied by a slight increase of the interest rates. 
Starting with the monetary policy impact, the results indicate that a positive shock in 
the effective federal funds rate leads to a decrease of the real stock returns (almost 2 
percentage points), in the short run. Conversely, expansionary monetary policy can lead to an 
appreciation of the real stock returns. 
In the same line, the impact of a monetary policy shock in the economic activity seems 
also to be intuitive. This means that under a shock that leads to a 1 percentage point increase 
of the effective federal funds rate, the economic conditions will tend to decrease 0.2 
percentage points, one year after. 
However, the impact of the output growth on the stock markets seems to be less 
intuitive and not significant. This gives us some clues about the bubble that was forming at 
the time, meaning that the investors might have looked at other indicators beyond the 
economic activity. However, the converse makes more sense since for a 1 percentage point 
increase of the real stock returns YoY, the industrial output reacts with an almost 0.4 
percentage points increase, one year after, what can sustain the arguments set in our literature 
review about the impact of the stock markets on the economic activity. 
Besides, it is also possible to identify a similar interest rate behavior as the previous 
period already analyzed. In other words, for a positive shock in the IPI YoY (1 percentage 
point increase), the interest rates will tend to increase (almost 0.2 percentage points). The 
correlation between the stock market performance the monetary policy path seems to follow 
the same path but the relation should be read with caution since zero is inside the confidence 
bands. Again, this shows us that the Central Bank was likely to increase the interest rates 








c) December 2001 until November 2007 
 
Output Figures 3: Impulse-Response Functions of the three variables (IPI growth rate YoY, effective 
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In terms of results, let’s start with the unintuitive impact of the output shock on the 
stock market. We can observe that a 1 percentage point rise in IPI YoY generates a negative 
reaction of the real stock returns YoY during the firsts 6 months at around 2 percentage 
points. Again, this can mean that, at the time, other variables could be influencing the real 
stock returns rather than economic activity. Similarly, the converse relation is not obvious. 
Facing a 1 percentage point increase of the real stock returns YoY, the output decreases in the 
short run (during the first year) but rises over the medium-term. However, it is possible to 
observe a significant positive impact of the real stock returns on the ISM index. 
It was no doubt, a period (before the Great Recession) where the stock markets 
increased significantly. Immediately after 2007, the stock markets started giving their first 
warnings (S&P500 index bear market) before the recession, even if the economy did not 
indicate the same. Confronting this with our results, the negative correlation between the two 
variables seems to make sense. Moreover, this is in line with the literature presented that 
indicates the stock market as a good predictor of the business cycles 
When we consider the monetary policy impact, the results are not significant. This can 
give us some clues about the importance that investors took to this variable at the time.  
Looking at the FED policy, the results are also not significant for the impact of 
economic activity. However, through our output, it is possible to observe a slight impact of 
the real stock returns on the FED policy. This means that for a 1 percentage point increase of 
the real S&P500 index, the effective federal funds rate tends to increase 0.05 percentage 
points. Yet, we are aware of the low significance of this result but this could indicate some 












d) July 2009 until March 2019 
 
Output Figures 4: Impulse-Response Functions of the three variables (IPI growth rate YoY, effective 
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As previously mentioned, this period is in some way uncommon due to the 
unconventional monetary policies conducted by the Central Bank of the United States. At the 
same time, we have been witnessing a very long bull market despite the slow economic 
recovery when compared to other post-recessions periods. Therefore, the objective is to 
understand the difference among the dynamics of the three variables and try to identify some 
patterns about this period (2009-2019). 
The first relevant result is the reaction of the stock markets to a shock in the output 
growth. In fact, a 1 percentage point increase of the latter gives rise to an increase of almost 2 
percentage points of the former, during the firsts 6 months. In some way, we can see the fact 
that the economic activity is affecting the stock returns more significantly in the short run, 
when compared with the other periods analyzed. This can give us a clue about the 
sensitiveness of the stock markets during this period. 
Moreover, the reaction of the output growth to a shock on the real stock returns seems 
to be similar to the other periods (except the period before the Great Recession). This means 
that the response of the IPI YoY to a real stock returns shock (1 percentage point increase) is 
almost 0.4 percentage points, during the first year. 
 Observing the monetary policy impact, we can see that the magnitude of the shocks in 
the effective federal funds rate is similar to the period before the Dotcom bubble. This means 
that an increase of 1 percentage point in the effective federal funds rate leads to a short-run 
decrease of the real stock returns YoY on almost 2 percentage points and 0.4 percentage 
points in the IPI YoY. 
In addition, the neutral impact of the stock returns and the economic activity on the 
effective federal funds rate seems an interesting result. Looking at what happened, the FED 
only started increasing the interest rate in December 2015 what gives us a small number of 
observations. It seems acceptable, with the S&P500 index hitting maximum values, month 
after month, the economic activity growing and the interest rates at the zero-lower bound, that 
the relation effects are not significant. 
 
Concluding this first subpart, it seems that monetary policy has having a significant 
direct impact not only on economic activity but also on the real stock returns of the S&P500 





significant impact of a shock to the economic activity on the real stock returns when 
compared to the two previous periods of expansion where the model suggests low 
significance. The question that we can ask if it is the case that investors are paying more 
attention to the economic indicators, namely to the performance of the companies, or, on the 
contrary, the greater sensitivity of stock markets to activity indicators is an indirect impact 
coming through an amplification effect of changes in economic conditions by the 
unconventional monetary policy. 
 
C. A different approach 
 
i. The model 
Having assessed the relation between macroeconomic variables, a different approach, 
accounting for real earnings of the companies, was adopted in order to develop, support, and 
complement our previous econometric regression model. Looking at figure 3, we can notice 
that the real earnings per share are also reaching historic maximum values. Knowing this 
statement, we wanted to test if those are having a significant relation with the stock returns. In 
other words, if this variable is contributing for the S&P500 index behavior. 
The model is quite similar to the previous one as well as the approach by the impulse-
response functions. The main difference is the variable “real earnings growth rate YoY” 
instead of the “IPI growth rate YoY”. 






Where, 𝑅𝐸𝑡 refers to real earnings growth rate YoY (real earnings YoY), and 𝐹𝐸𝐷𝑡 to effective federal 
(Fed) funds rate, and 𝑆𝑅𝑡 to real stock returns YoY. 
 
Here we are assuming that the Real Earnings variable reacts immediately only to its 
own shock. An example of this shock can be a technology shock that suddenly increases the 
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productivity of the companies. The other shocks were already explained in our previous 
econometric regression model. 
Again, an important note should be made in order to enhance the fact that the three 
variables are endogenous among themselves. 















ii. Robustness of the model 
The econometric regression satisfies the stability condition for all the periods that will 
be analyzed. This means that no roots lie outside the unit circle, a necessary condition for the 
robustness of our model. 
 
iii. The results 
Again, the lag length is defined as the previous model using to the same five 
information criteria of the previous VAR model. 
 In this model, we shall focus on the relation between real earnings growth rate and real 
stock returns, both YoY, since the relation between the monetary policy and real stock returns 
appears to be quite similar to the model analyzed previously. 
Once again, we shall analyze period by period in order to be able to have a critical 
view of the present period. Similarly, the results obtained by the impulse-response functions 









a) April 1991 – March 2019 
During the all sample analyzed (1991-2019), it is possible to identify a positive 
correlation, for both sides, between real stock returns and real earnings growth rate, what is in 
line with the results set in our previous model. 
This means, that upon a 1 percentage point increase of the real earnings growth rate 
YoY, the reaction of the real stock returns is to increase almost 2 percentage points. The 
opposite is also true, with a response of 20 percentage points increase of the real earnings one 
year after the shock of a 1 percentage point increase of the real stock returns YoY. However, 
this last relation is compensated by a negative one in the medium term. 
The first result is quite intuitive since if the companies are more profitable, they 
should be more valuable, which we see at least in the short term. Looking in particular at the 
second one, it would make sense if we assume that the investors are rational agents. This is in 
the sense that people are investing today because they are expecting an increase of the real 
earnings in a near future. Nevertheless, this is only a possible clue for the justification because 
of the limitations of our VAR model. A deeper analysis is needed in order to interpret 
consistently this result. 
 
b) April 1991 – February 2001 
Considering the period prior to the Dotcom bubble, the relation between the real 
earnings per share and the real stock returns is not so evident. This lack of clarity complicates 
the analysis that could be done. 
 However, the non-significant result presented in this output sustains our first analysis 
about the possibility of some other variable affecting the real stock returns of the S&P500 
index.  
Focusing on the response of the real earnings to a positive shock in the real stock 
returns can show us, in some way, the irrationality of the agents. In other words, this evinces 
that the agents invested, which led to a 1 percentage point of the real stock returns, against a 
null return. 
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c) December 2001 – November 2007 
Output Figures 5: Impulse-Response Functions of the two variables (real earnings per share growth rate 
YoY, real stock returns YoY) by the Cholesky decomposition, between December 2001 and November 
2007. 
 
Considering the period before the Great Recession, it is interesting to observe that the 
impact of the real earnings shock on real stock returns has the opposite signal from the shock 
to output growth. That because, a rise in economic activity has a negative effect on the real 
stock returns and, contrarily, a rise in the companies’ financial performance suggests a 
positive one. 
As we can see by the output, a short-run shock of the real earnings YoY (1 percentage 
point increase) will tend to affect positively by around 2 percentage points the real stock 
returns YoY. This result seems to be aligned with what happened at the time (high profits and 
slowdown economic activity), as the real stock returns grew faster than the real earnings of 
the S&P500 index companies. 
Considering the response of the real earnings to a shock on the real stock returns YoY 
is more complicated to analyze. Therefore, more work needs to be done in this field in order 
to interpret the result set on our output. 
 
d) July 2009 – March 2019 
Finally, taking into account the focus period of this dissertation the results seem to be 
aligned when compared with our previous VAR model. 
Again, we can observe a significant response of the real stock returns to a shock in the 
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percentage points. This illustrates well the fact that equity valuations grew faster than 
earnings. 
In the same line, the impact of the real stock returns YoY is quite difficult to analyze, 
having a positive short run impact compensated by a negative one in the medium term. More 
work needs to be done in this field in order to have some guidelines to interpret this result. 
 
Having concluded this second VAR approach, we can observe a higher sensitivity of 
the S&P500 index to a shock on the real earnings considering the focus period, when 
compared to the whole sample. 
However, more work needs to be done in order to analyze if this current relation of the 
stock returns is due only to an increase of the real earnings or if we are also in presence of an 
overreaction by the investors. 
 
 
4. The simulation estimation 
 
Finally, having studied the relation between the economic activity, the monetary 
policy, the companies’ financial performance and the stock markets, we are going to simulate 
the excess returns of the S&P500 index through a model established by Cochrane (2011). The 
goal is to analyze the current excess returns, in particular the stock prices, through a 
significant historic relation with the dividend yield variable, in order to sustain and 
complement our previous conclusions and, additionally, forecast it for the next five years. 
Although, it is important to note the fact that the classic “efficient-markets” theory 
states that this variable is not predictable since we are in presence of a “random walk”. 
However, as observed by Campbell and Shiller (1998), the smoothed price-earnings 
and the dividend-price ratios are two good leading indicators of stock prices. As we can see 
through the figure 8, the CAPE ratio predicted the two last booms in the financial markets, 
namely in the S&P500 index – in other words, the Dotcom bubble and the Great Recession. 
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Figure 8: The CAPE Ratio and the real prices of the S&P500 index. 
 
Right axis: Real S&P500 Index 
Left axis: CAPE Ratio S&P500 Index 
 
 
As it was already said, Cochrane (2011), presented one important equation that will be 
adopted to our exercise. The equation relates the returns in the near future with the current 
level of the dividend yield. After testing the model for a time horizon of 1 and 5 years, the 
author achieved the following conclusion: “High prices, relative to dividends, have reliably 
preceded many years of poor returns. Low prices have preceded high returns.”20.  
Therefore, the equation presented by Cochrane is: 
𝑅𝑡→𝑡+ℎ
𝑒 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 ×
𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑡
⁄ +  𝜗𝑡  , 
Where 𝑅𝑡→𝑡+ℎ
𝑒   represents the excess returns, and 
𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑡
⁄  the dividend yield. 
 
 
                                                          

























In addition, it is important to note that the author proposed to analyze the expected 
excess returns in stocks, which means: 
𝑅𝑡+1
𝑒 = 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 −  𝑅𝑡+1
𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑  , which can be generalized to  
𝑅𝑡+𝑛
𝑒 = 𝑅𝑡+𝑛
𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 −  𝑅𝑡+𝑛
𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 
Where 𝑅𝑡→𝑡+𝑛
𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘   represents the stock returns, and 𝑅𝑡→𝑡+𝑛
𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑  the returns of a bond (interest rate). 
 
The dependent variable is the stocks’ excess return, which gives the return 
obtained/demanded by an investor to bear risk.  
 Looking in a more detailed perspective at the dividend yield, which will be our 
exogenous variable, if we consider a broader period (since 1881), the real dividend has been 
below the historical average (figure 9). Besides, even if we look at a more recent average 
(since 1980), we can also identify two long periods below the average – between 1995 and 
2008 and from 2009 until nowadays. 
 
Figure 9: Dividend Yield of the S&P500 index. 
 
Was there a structural change, after 2009, in the relation between macroeconomic and the stock market’s 
performance in the United States? 
46 
 
A. The model 
Applying this theoretical econometric regression model to our reality, we decided to 
study the regression with a horizon of five years (for a h=5) since it was the more significant 
coefficient of the John Cochrane’s econometric results, in order to identify the relationship 
between the stock returns of the S&P500 index and the associated dividend yield. 
The econometric regression model used for our analysis is the following: 
𝑅𝑡→𝑡+5
𝑒 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 ×
𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑡
⁄ + 𝜗𝑡 
 
B. The data 
In order to approach this econometric model, it was decided to use annual data from 
1951 up to 2018.  As it was already said, the goal is to estimate the current excess returns 
based on the historical relation, namely during the period 1951-2009, and compare the 
forecasted values with the “actual” ones (focus period of this dissertation) and, additionally, 
forecast it for the next five years. 
The annual frequency used, as explained by Cochrane, is to avoid the 
daily/weekly/monthly volatility since the objective is to assess longer horizons, such as 5 
years. 
The data used was the following: 
 As it was argued by Cochrane, the best way to address this problem is to use expected 





𝑇−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙 3𝑀 , 
Where 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑒  are the expected excess returns, 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑆&𝑃500 the returns of the S&P500 index, and 
𝑅𝑡+1









𝑇−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙 3𝑀 = 𝑖𝑡→𝑡+5
𝑇−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙 3𝑀






Where, the upper bar denotes annual average. 
 
This equation means that the excess returns of the investor will equal the returns of the 
S&P500 index minus the returns given by the 3-month treasury bill, both nominal 
values. 
 
 The Dividend Yield is from the S&P500 index and is in nominal terms. 
 
C. The robustness of the model 
The forecast model can be estimated by OLS. In presence of heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation, it was decided to use the Robust Standard Errors with the heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent covariance (HAC) estimators, using the Newey-West 
covariance method. With this, the coefficients of the econometric model are unbiased and 
consistent. 
 
D. The results 
Therefore, the results are in line with what Cochrane found some years ago21. Looking 
in more detail, the output of this new regression for the S&P500 index, can be see seen in the 
table below: 
Table 2: Output of the simulation model, between 1951 and 2009. 
Period: 1951 – 2009 
Dependent Variable: Excess Returns 
Exogenous Variable Coefficient 𝑹𝟐 Standard Error P-value 
Dividend Yield 15.23 21.09% 4.42 0.0011 
 
In this case, the output means that a 1 percentage point increase of the dividend yield 
leads, on average and “ceteris paribus”, to an increase of 15.23 percentage points in the 
excess returns.  
                                                          
21 The output figure can be assessed in the Appendix. 
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It is interesting to notice, through the Output Figures 6, that the gross deviations of the 
actual excess returns from the model are followed by significant downward corrections of the 
stock markets. This was the case in the crashes in 1987, 2000, and 2008. 
Moreover, since 2013 a gap has been forming place between the “true” values of the 
excess returns and the forecasted ones. In other words, this suggests that the actual excess 
returns might be overvalued when compared with the excess returns forecasted based on the 
historical behavior. As during this period, T-Bill 3M interest rates have been pretty constant 
near zero, this shows that the increase of the excess returns is being due to stock prices 
increase, what is line with previous findings this dissertation. 
Moreover, it is observable that the tendency of the forecasted values is to remain 
stable suggesting that a correction of the real ones could occur, during the next 5 years, in 
order to decrease the gap and bring the values to normal levels. 
 
Output Figures 6: The forecasted excess returns versus the actuals’ excess returns, between 1951 and 2023. 
 
Where the “EXCESS_RETF” are the values of the excess returns forecasted and the “Actuals” are the 


















What we have seen during this dissertation is not conclusive but can give us some 
clues about the current relation among the four variables – stock markets, monetary policy, 
companies’ financial performance and the economic activity – during a period of 
unconventional monetary policies. This relation is important in order to try to identify some 
current patterns, that in some way, could explain the S&P500 index bull market that we have 
been witnessing since 2009 under this period of unconventional monetary policies led by the 
FED. 
An important fact is that the CAPE for the S&P500 index is higher when comparing 
with the average since 1980. Moreover, this indicator has been boosted by an increase of the 
real stock prices since real earnings have also been following a similar growing trajectory. In 
addition to that, it is possible to observe abnormal levels of the excess returns of the S&P500 
index, through the Cochrane (2011) regression, when compared to the forecasted values 
obtained through the historical behavior. A similar situation happened before 1987, 2000, and 
2008, and was followed by significant downward corrections of the stock markets. In the 
same line, the forecasting exercise for the next 5 years suggests stability what can means 
important price corrections may take place. 
Therefore, what this work seems to suggest is that, since 2009, real stock returns YoY 
of the S&P500 index react more forcefully to a shock on the economic activity and on the 
financial conditions of the companies (here represented by the IPI growth rate YoY and the 
real earnings growth rate YoY, respectively). Parallel to this, we can also identify a second 
significant result related with the direct impact of the monetary policy on real stock returns. 
The question that could be approached in other studies is whether these impacts are an 
indirect effect of the unconventional monetary policy or any other reason.  
Some guidelines about the portfolio rebalancing, liquidity, technology impacts, 
investors sensitiveness could be useful for further research in order to better interpret the 
results that sustain the relations presented in this dissertation. 
 
 
Was there a structural change, after 2009, in the relation between macroeconomic and the stock market’s 





 Data sources: 
 
- Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta – Wu-Xia Shadow Rate. 
- Federal Reserve of St. Louis – Economic Research (FRED) – Industrial 
Production Index, Effective Federal Funds Rate, T-Bill 3M, T-Bill 6M, Real 
GDP. 
- Quandl – Institute Supply Management Index (PMI Composite). 
- Robert Shiller’s data (http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm) –Real prices 
S&P500 index, Real earnings per share, CAPE Ratio, Nominal dividends per 
share, Monthly nominal stock prices S&P500 index, Dividend Yield. 
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Method: ML - Binary Logit  (Newton-Raphson / Marquardt steps)
Date: 01/26/20   Time: 13:20
Sample: 4/01/1991 2/28/2001
Included observations: 2506
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations
Coefficient covariance computed using observed Hessian
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.680917 0.049407 -13.78169 0.0000
DP1 0.184974 0.107625 1.718696 0.0857
DP2 0.593056 0.148294 3.999202 0.0001
McFadden R-squared 0.005224     Mean dependent var 0.355547
S.D. dependent var 0.478774     S.E. of regression 0.477286
Akaike info criterion 1.297221     Sum squared resid 570.1892
Schwarz criterion 1.304196     Log likelihood -1622.418
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.299753     Deviance 3244.835
Restr. deviance 3261.874     Restr. log likelihood -1630.937
LR statistic 17.03857     Avg. log likelihood -0.647413
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000200
Obs with Dep=0 1615      Total obs 2506
Obs with Dep=1 891
Dependent Variable: STOCK_RETURNS
Method: ML - Binary Logit  (Newton-Raphson / Marquardt steps)
Date: 01/26/20   Time: 13:29
Sample: 12/03/2001 11/30/2007
Included observations: 1510
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations
Coefficient covariance computed using observed Hessian
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -1.325283 0.066877 -19.81672 0.0000
DP1 -0.040808 0.233830 -0.174522 0.8615
DP2 1.067454 0.329774 3.236930 0.0012
McFadden R-squared 0.006229     Mean dependent var 0.215232
S.D. dependent var 0.411119     S.E. of regression 0.409813
Akaike info criterion 1.039098     Sum squared resid 253.0952
Schwarz criterion 1.049667     Log likelihood -781.5189
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.043034     Deviance 1563.038
Restr. deviance 1572.835     Restr. log likelihood -786.4177
LR statistic 9.797544     Avg. log likelihood -0.517562
Prob(LR statistic) 0.007456
Obs with Dep=0 1185      Total obs 1510
Obs with Dep=1 325
Dependent Variable: STOCK_RETURNS
Method: ML - Binary Logit  (Newton-Raphson / Marquardt steps)
Date: 01/26/20   Time: 13:32
Sample: 7/01/2009 3/29/2019
Included observations: 2453
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations
Coefficient covariance computed using observed Hessian
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -1.469409 0.057273 -25.65636 0.0000
DP1 -0.172068 0.176183 -0.976643 0.3287
DP2 0.406902 0.178633 2.277867 0.0227
McFadden R-squared 0.002686     Mean dependent var 0.189564
S.D. dependent var 0.392036     S.E. of regression 0.391655
Akaike info criterion 0.971017     Sum squared resid 375.8144
Schwarz criterion 0.978116     Log likelihood -1187.952
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.973597     Deviance 2375.905
Restr. deviance 2382.304     Restr. log likelihood -1191.152
LR statistic 6.399265     Avg. log likelihood -0.484285
Prob(LR statistic) 0.040777
Obs with Dep=0 1988      Total obs 2453
Obs with Dep=1 465
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b) The Vector Auto-Regression models 
VAR (IPI growth rate YoY, effective federal funds rate, real stock returns 
YoY) 





Date: 12/31/19   Time: 10:44
Sample: 1991M04 2019M03
Included observations: 336
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
IPI_YOY EFFECTIVE_ REAL_STOC
IPI_YOY(-1)  0.945333  0.030662  0.626166
 (0.05580)  (0.01122)  (0.35208)
[ 16.9424] [ 2.73239] [ 1.77845]
IPI_YOY(-2)  0.078703 -0.018611  0.751711
 (0.07773)  (0.01563)  (0.49049)
[ 1.01251] [-1.19050] [ 1.53258]
IPI_YOY(-3)  0.050363  0.014416 -1.159745
 (0.07685)  (0.01546)  (0.48492)
[ 0.65536] [ 0.93272] [-2.39161]
IPI_YOY(-4) -0.023033 -0.042349 -0.873009
 (0.07737)  (0.01556)  (0.48823)
[-0.29769] [-2.72153] [-1.78812]
IPI_YOY(-5) -0.017553  0.000378  0.462673
 (0.07804)  (0.01569)  (0.49243)
[-0.22492] [ 0.02407] [ 0.93957]
IPI_YOY(-6) -0.126924  0.023294  0.306357
 (0.05381)  (0.01082)  (0.33953)
[-2.35884] [ 2.15253] [ 0.90230]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN  0.140652  1.403354 -1.482907
 (0.27423)  (0.05515)  (1.73039)
[ 0.51291] [ 25.4454] [-0.85698]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN -0.179413 -0.330596  2.016500
 (0.47044)  (0.09461)  (2.96853)
[-0.38137] [-3.49416] [ 0.67929]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN  0.163344  0.043148  1.902457
 (0.47094)  (0.09472)  (2.97171)
[ 0.34684] [ 0.45555] [ 0.64019]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN -0.207288 -0.184947 -3.002856
 (0.46933)  (0.09439)  (2.96153)
[-0.44167] [-1.95938] [-1.01396]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN  0.261434  0.169464  1.490567
 (0.46028)  (0.09257)  (2.90442)
[ 0.56799] [ 1.83065] [ 0.51321]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN -0.155652 -0.108868 -0.954108
 (0.26310)  (0.05291)  (1.66017)
[-0.59161] [-2.05747] [-0.57470]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR  0.011782  0.004353  1.139985
 (0.00890)  (0.00179)  (0.05619)
[ 1.32315] [ 2.43089] [ 20.2894]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR  0.022921 -0.005058 -0.188435
 (0.01360)  (0.00274)  (0.08584)
[ 1.68489] [-1.84875] [-2.19510]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR  0.010901 -0.000272 -0.011454
 (0.01374)  (0.00276)  (0.08670)
[ 0.79334] [-0.09856] [-0.13211]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR -0.035879 -0.000787 -0.116952
 (0.01374)  (0.00276)  (0.08671)
[-2.61085] [-0.28489] [-1.34870]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR  0.008664  0.002953  0.157449
 (0.01379)  (0.00277)  (0.08704)
[ 0.62809] [ 1.06435] [ 1.80886]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR -0.005009 -0.001467 -0.080580
 (0.00952)  (0.00192)  (0.06009)
[-0.52592] [-0.76608] [-1.34093]
C  0.056273  0.003641  0.510044
 (0.05765)  (0.01160)  (0.36381)
[ 0.97604] [ 0.31399] [ 1.40196]
R-squared  0.966586  0.997016  0.911171
Adj. R-squared  0.964689  0.996847  0.906127
Sum sq. resids  176.9531  7.157420  7045.809
S.E. equation  0.747136  0.150262  4.714502
F-statistic  509.4493  5884.841  180.6481
Log likelihood -369.0373  169.8622 -988.0003
Akaike AIC  2.309746 -0.897989  5.994049
Schwarz SC  2.525594 -0.682141  6.209898
Mean dependent  2.023020  2.370294  6.545811
S.D. dependent  3.975974  2.675954  15.38744
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  0.275882
Determinant resid covariance  0.231677
Log likelihood -1184.605
Akaike information criterion  7.390506
Schwarz criterion  8.038051





VAR (IPI growth rate YoY, T-Bill 6M, real stock returns YoY) 





Date: 02/07/20   Time: 12:38
Sample: 1991M04 2019M03
Included observations: 336
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
IPI_YOY T_BILL_6M REAL_STOC
IPI_YOY(-1)  0.905899  0.027771  0.676620
 (0.05569)  (0.01111)  (0.35940)
[ 16.2654] [ 2.49941] [ 1.88265]
IPI_YOY(-2)  0.077035 -0.026782  0.720747
 (0.07600)  (0.01516)  (0.49040)
[ 1.01365] [-1.76646] [ 1.46970]
IPI_YOY(-3)  0.057977  0.017618 -1.186181
 (0.07629)  (0.01522)  (0.49232)
[ 0.75992] [ 1.15749] [-2.40938]
IPI_YOY(-4) -0.005953 -0.020383 -0.812259
 (0.07596)  (0.01515)  (0.49017)
[-0.07836] [-1.34502] [-1.65709]
IPI_YOY(-5) -0.027981 -0.002626  0.283285
 (0.07632)  (0.01523)  (0.49248)
[-0.36664] [-0.17250] [ 0.57522]
IPI_YOY(-6) -0.011653 -0.007744  0.434664
 (0.07524)  (0.01501)  (0.48552)
[-0.15488] [-0.51590] [ 0.89526]
IPI_YOY(-7) -0.109223  0.017279 -0.017187
 (0.05274)  (0.01052)  (0.34031)
[-2.07106] [ 1.64226] [-0.05050]
T_BILL_6M(-1)  0.951225  1.420666 -5.242759
 (0.27612)  (0.05509)  (1.78181)
[ 3.44493] [ 25.7896] [-2.94237]
T_BILL_6M(-2) -0.670977 -0.439458  7.048895
 (0.48465)  (0.09669)  (3.12742)
[-1.38446] [-4.54513] [ 2.25390]
T_BILL_6M(-3) -0.699575  0.174678 -1.604481
 (0.50278)  (0.10031)  (3.24443)
[-1.39141] [ 1.74146] [-0.49453]
T_BILL_6M(-4)  0.476990 -0.288873  2.357057
 (0.49882)  (0.09951)  (3.21887)
[ 0.95624] [-2.90281] [ 0.73226]
T_BILL_6M(-5) -0.266397  0.116339 -4.042480
 (0.50320)  (0.10039)  (3.24713)
[-0.52941] [ 1.15889] [-1.24494]
T_BILL_6M(-6)  0.845211  0.159755  4.315755
 (0.48843)  (0.09744)  (3.15182)
[ 1.73047] [ 1.63949] [ 1.36929]
T_BILL_6M(-7) -0.584535 -0.155431 -2.881780
 (0.27744)  (0.05535)  (1.79034)
[-2.10686] [-2.80813] [-1.60963]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR  0.012447  0.003710  1.155758
 (0.00873)  (0.00174)  (0.05631)
[ 1.42647] [ 2.13136] [ 20.5253]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR  0.018055 -0.001930 -0.197998
 (0.01324)  (0.00264)  (0.08545)
[ 1.36351] [-0.73073] [-2.31725]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR  0.011125 -0.002875 -0.000269
 (0.01328)  (0.00265)  (0.08573)
[ 0.83740] [-1.08482] [-0.00314]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR -0.033112  0.000244 -0.132267
 (0.01328)  (0.00265)  (0.08566)
[-2.49426] [ 0.09206] [-1.54400]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR  0.013702  0.003845  0.166630
 (0.01342)  (0.00268)  (0.08659)
[ 1.02112] [ 1.43643] [ 1.92432]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR -0.005584 -0.006785 -0.129548
 (0.01324)  (0.00264)  (0.08541)
[-0.42185] [-2.56953] [-1.51672]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR -0.003548  0.004395  0.047256
 (0.00915)  (0.00183)  (0.05905)
[-0.38774] [ 2.40771] [ 0.80029]
C  0.025166  0.015220  0.531060
 (0.06539)  (0.01305)  (0.42195)
[ 0.38486] [ 1.16674] [ 1.25859]
R-squared  0.969002  0.995489  0.913821
Adj. R-squared  0.966929  0.995187  0.908058
Sum sq. resids  164.1571  6.533527  6835.624
S.E. equation  0.723044  0.144248  4.665780
F-statistic  467.4202  3299.375  158.5517
Log likelihood -356.4270  185.1842 -982.9124
Akaike AIC  2.252542 -0.971335  5.981621
Schwarz SC  2.502472 -0.721405  6.231551
Mean dependent  2.023020  2.629857  6.545811
S.D. dependent  3.975974  2.079189  15.38744
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  0.234797
Determinant resid covariance  0.191630
Log likelihood -1152.722
Akaike information criterion  7.254299
Schwarz criterion  8.004089
Number of coefficients  66
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o Impulse-response functions (Cholesky decomposition): 
 
- April 1991 – February 2001: 
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Response of REAL_STOCK_RETURNS to REAL_STOCK_RETURNS
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- December 2001 – November 2007: 
o Impulse-response functions (Cholesky decomposition): 
 
- July 2009 – March 2019: 
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Response to Cholesky One S.D. (d.f. adjusted) Innovations – 2 S.E.
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VAR (real earnings, effective federal funds rate, real stock returns YoY) 





Date: 12/31/19   Time: 11:30
Sample: 1991M04 2019M03
Included observations: 336
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
REAL_EARN EFFECTIVE_ REAL_STOC
REAL_EARNINGS_YOY(  1.363418 -0.000767  0.021771
 (0.05636)  (0.00049)  (0.01548)
[ 24.1901] [-1.55513] [ 1.40656]
REAL_EARNINGS_YOY( -0.300865  0.000751 -0.048983
 (0.09426)  (0.00083)  (0.02588)
[-3.19196] [ 0.91045] [-1.89235]
REAL_EARNINGS_YOY(  0.336192  0.000323  0.029993
 (0.08247)  (0.00072)  (0.02265)
[ 4.07674] [ 0.44751] [ 1.32441]
REAL_EARNINGS_YOY( -0.811670  3.68E-06 -0.020244
 (0.08265)  (0.00072)  (0.02270)
[-9.82039] [ 0.00508] [-0.89189]
REAL_EARNINGS_YOY(  0.292274 -0.000919  0.024171
 (0.09296)  (0.00081)  (0.02553)
[ 3.14411] [-1.12929] [ 0.94685]
REAL_EARNINGS_YOY(  0.059868  0.000496 -0.007436
 (0.05411)  (0.00047)  (0.01486)
[ 1.10638] [ 1.04799] [-0.50041]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN -3.958239  1.427890 -1.340246
 (6.38491)  (0.05589)  (1.75340)
[-0.61994] [ 25.5469] [-0.76437]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN  9.239273 -0.351738  2.293702
 (11.0593)  (0.09681)  (3.03708)
[ 0.83543] [-3.63320] [ 0.75523]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN  4.322320  0.028806  0.973496
 (11.2120)  (0.09815)  (3.07901)
[ 0.38551] [ 0.29349] [ 0.31617]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN -21.64205 -0.165752 -2.411644
 (11.1979)  (0.09803)  (3.07513)
[-1.93269] [-1.69092] [-0.78424]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN  13.55030  0.176113  1.981009
 (10.9539)  (0.09589)  (3.00812)
[ 1.23703] [ 1.83662] [ 0.65855]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN -1.879400 -0.122236 -1.516591
 (6.22464)  (0.05449)  (1.70939)
[-0.30193] [-2.24327] [-0.88721]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR  0.347283  0.005596  1.141026
 (0.20663)  (0.00181)  (0.05674)
[ 1.68069] [ 3.09369] [ 20.1082]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR  0.207430 -0.006399 -0.217108
 (0.31427)  (0.00275)  (0.08630)
[ 0.66003] [-2.32610] [-2.51559]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR -0.490538  0.000316  0.039243
 (0.32080)  (0.00281)  (0.08810)
[-1.52910] [ 0.11245] [ 0.44545]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR  0.321574  0.001571 -0.018342
 (0.32210)  (0.00282)  (0.08845)
[ 0.99836] [ 0.55713] [-0.20736]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR  0.399853  0.002590  0.114313
 (0.31932)  (0.00280)  (0.08769)
[ 1.25220] [ 0.92653] [ 1.30359]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR -0.833556 -0.002690 -0.139380
 (0.21254)  (0.00186)  (0.05837)
[-3.92185] [-1.44567] [-2.38798]
C  2.451563  0.010307  0.618985
 (1.39119)  (0.01218)  (0.38204)
[ 1.76220] [ 0.84634] [ 1.62019]
R-squared  0.974602  0.996881  0.907184
Adj. R-squared  0.973160  0.996704  0.901914
Sum sq. resids  97621.36  7.480800  7362.044
S.E. equation  17.54861  0.153619  4.819140
F-statistic  675.8028  5629.690  172.1319
Log likelihood -1429.616  162.4382 -995.3763
Akaike AIC  8.622713 -0.853799  6.037954
Schwarz SC  8.838561 -0.637951  6.253803
Mean dependent  21.38782  2.370294  6.545811
S.D. dependent  107.1156  2.675954  15.38744
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  161.0168
Determinant resid covariance  135.2169
Log likelihood -2254.646
Akaike information criterion  13.75980
Schwarz criterion  14.40734





o Impulse-response functions (Cholesky decomposition): 
 
- April 1991 – February 2001: 
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- December 2001 – November 2007: 
o Impulse-response functions (Cholesky decomposition): 
 
 
- July 2009 – March 2019: 
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VAR (ISM, effective federal funds rate, real stock returns YoY) 





Date: 12/31/19   Time: 10:59
Sample: 1991M04 2019M03
Included observations: 336
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
ISM EFFECTIVE_ REAL_STOC
ISM(-1)  0.882443  0.006136 -0.023422
 (0.05621)  (0.00497)  (0.15653)
[ 15.6990] [ 1.23485] [-0.14963]
ISM(-2)  0.120632 -0.004394  0.270710
 (0.07513)  (0.00664)  (0.20921)
[ 1.60570] [-0.66164] [ 1.29399]
ISM(-3) -0.020863 -0.000711  0.043689
 (0.07584)  (0.00670)  (0.21119)
[-0.27509] [-0.10613] [ 0.20687]
ISM(-4) -0.148462  0.005883 -0.283870
 (0.05466)  (0.00483)  (0.15221)
[-2.71605] [ 1.21754] [-1.86494]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN  0.824790  1.389128 -0.676130
 (0.63045)  (0.05573)  (1.75561)
[ 1.30825] [ 24.9260] [-0.38512]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN -0.843495 -0.320422  0.650796
 (1.07319)  (0.09487)  (2.98850)
[-0.78597] [-3.37761] [ 0.21777]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN -0.417623  0.031260  2.486327
 (1.06353)  (0.09401)  (2.96161)
[-0.39267] [ 0.33251] [ 0.83952]
EFFECTIVE_FED_FUN  0.349311 -0.103274 -2.463098
 (0.61870)  (0.05469)  (1.72289)
[ 0.56459] [-1.88830] [-1.42963]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR  0.059447  0.004698  1.152275
 (0.01999)  (0.00177)  (0.05568)
[ 2.97324] [ 2.65794] [ 20.6956]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR -0.030500 -0.005875 -0.236351
 (0.03060)  (0.00270)  (0.08521)
[-0.99677] [-2.17209] [-2.77385]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR -0.021918  0.000264  0.035035
 (0.03085)  (0.00273)  (0.08591)
[-0.71042] [ 0.09683] [ 0.40779]
REAL_STOCK_RETUR  0.015909  0.000917 -0.025497
 (0.02043)  (0.00181)  (0.05689)
[ 0.77877] [ 0.50769] [-0.44821]
C  8.832880 -0.359113  0.119434
 (1.60410)  (0.14180)  (4.46691)
[ 5.50644] [-2.53258] [ 0.02674]
R-squared  0.873469  0.996853  0.905545
Adj. R-squared  0.868768  0.996736  0.902036
Sum sq. resids  966.1598  7.549571  7492.054
S.E. equation  1.729511  0.152883  4.816141
F-statistic  185.8111  8525.743  258.0524
Log likelihood -654.2080  160.9009 -998.3172
Akaike AIC  3.971476 -0.880362  6.019745
Schwarz SC  4.119162 -0.732676  6.167431
Mean dependent  52.63065  2.370294  6.545811
S.D. dependent  4.774233  2.675954  15.38744
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  1.547852
Determinant resid covariance  1.375052
Log likelihood -1483.797
Akaike information criterion  9.064266
Schwarz criterion  9.507323
Number of coefficients  39
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o Impulse-response functions (Cholesky decomposition): 
 
 
- April 1991 – February 2001: 
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- December 2001 – November 2007: 




- July 2009 – March 2019: 
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Response of  REAL_STOCK_RETURNS_YOY to REAL_STOCK_RETURNS_YOY
Response to Cholesky One S.D. (d.f. adjusted) Innovations – 2 S.E.
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c) Simulation model – Ordinary Least Squares with Heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent covariance (HAC) estimators 
 





Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test on EXCESS_RETURNS_5
Null Hypothesis: EXCESS_RETURNS_5 has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Bandwidth: 1 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel
Adj. t-Stat   Prob.*
Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.988936  0.0410
Test critical values: 1% level -3.530030
5% level -2.904848
10% level -2.589907
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Residual variance (no correction)  0.076052




Date: 12/27/19   Time: 10:56
Sample: 1951 2018
Included observations: 68
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
EXCESS_RETURNS_5( -0.212416 0.075722 -2.805218 0.0066
C 0.102665 0.048179 2.130882 0.0368
R-squared 0.106529     Mean dependent var 0.006754
Adjusted R-squared 0.092992     S.D. dependent var 0.293922
S.E. of regression 0.279922     Akaike info criterion 0.320361
Sum squared resid 5.171526     Schwarz criterion 0.385640
Log likelihood -8.892264     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.346226
F-statistic 7.869246     Durbin-Watson stat 1.665247
Prob(F-statistic) 0.006600
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test on DIVIDEND_YIELD
Null Hypothesis: DIVIDEND_YIELD has a unit root
Exogenous: None
Bandwidth: 2 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel
Adj. t-Stat   Prob.*
Phillips-Perron test statistic -2.389776  0.0173
Test critical values: 1% level -2.599413
5% level -1.945669
10% level -1.613677
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Residual variance (no correction)  1.77E-05




Date: 12/27/19   Time: 10:01
Sample: 1951 2018
Included observations: 68
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
DIVIDEND_YIELD(-1) -0.034131 0.014687 -2.323881 0.0232
R-squared 0.047584     Mean dependent var -0.000736
Adjusted R-squared 0.047584     S.D. dependent var 0.004339
S.E. of regression 0.004235     Akaike info criterion -8.076448
Sum squared resid 0.001201     Schwarz criterion -8.043808










The LM Test (Lagrange Multiplier) is a general principle for testing hypothesis (under the 






F-statistic 2.119538     Prob. F(1,57) 0.1509
Obs*R-squared 2.115252     Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.1458




Date: 12/27/19   Time: 10:59
Sample: 1951 2009
Included observations: 59
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.354451 0.140684 2.519485 0.0146
DIVIDEND_YIELD(-5) -5.257379 3.611176 -1.455863 0.1509
R-squared 0.035852     Mean dependent var 0.162710
Adjusted R-squared 0.018937     S.D. dependent var 0.383567
S.E. of regression 0.379918     Akaike info criterion 0.935589
Sum squared resid 8.227259     Schwarz criterion 1.006014
Log likelihood -25.59988     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.963080
F-statistic 2.119538     Durbin-Watson stat 0.607796
Prob(F-statistic) 0.150917
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
Null hypothesis: No serial correlation at up to 4 lags
F-statistic 28.50536     Prob. F(4,53) 0.0000




Date: 12/27/19   Time: 10:59
Sample: 1951 2009
Included observations: 59
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.131182 0.096322 -1.361906 0.1790
DIVIDEND_YIELD(-5) 3.456098 2.497539 1.383801 0.1722
RESID(-1) 1.002827 0.137896 7.272348 0.0000
RESID(-2) -0.168387 0.192611 -0.874237 0.3859
RESID(-3) -0.123634 0.197779 -0.625115 0.5346
RESID(-4) 0.096285 0.147460 0.652961 0.5166
R-squared 0.682675     Mean dependent var -7.72E-17
Adjusted R-squared 0.652739     S.D. dependent var 0.406836
S.E. of regression 0.239744     Akaike info criterion 0.077651
Sum squared resid 3.046281     Schwarz criterion 0.288926
Log likelihood 3.709294     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.160124
F-statistic 22.80429     Durbin-Watson stat 1.900419
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Date: 12/27/19   Time: 11:01
Sample: 1951 2009
Included observations: 59
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed
        bandwidth = 4.0000)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.096070 0.233563 -0.411323 0.6824
DIVIDEND_YIELD(-5) 15.22536 4.422934 3.442367 0.0011
R-squared 0.210903     Mean dependent var 0.459211
Adjusted R-squared 0.197059     S.D. dependent var 0.457988
S.E. of regression 0.410389     Akaike info criterion 1.089888
Sum squared resid 9.599892     Schwarz criterion 1.160313
Log likelihood -30.15170     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.117379
F-statistic 15.23445     Durbin-Watson stat 0.382448
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000254     Wald F-statistic 11.84989
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.001087
